

**BATS BYX EXCHANGE, INC.**  
**LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, WAIVER AND CONSENT**  
**NO. 20120348296-09**

TO: Bats BYX Exchange, Inc.  
c/o Department of Market Regulation  
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")

RE: J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Respondent  
Broker-Dealer  
CRD No. 79

Pursuant to Rule 8.3 of the Rules of Bats BYX Exchange, Inc. ("BYX" or the "Exchange"), J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, (CRD No. 79) ("JPMS" or the "Firm") submits this Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ("AWC") for the purpose of proposing a settlement of the alleged rule violations described below. This AWC is submitted on the condition that, if accepted; BYX will not bring any future actions against the Firm alleging violations based on the same factual findings described herein.

**I.**

**ACCEPTANCE AND CONSENT**

- A. The Firm hereby accepts and consents, without admitting or denying the findings; and solely for the purposes of this proceeding and any other proceeding brought by or on behalf of BYX; or to which BYX is a party, prior to a hearing and without an adjudication of any issue of law or fact, to the entry of the following findings by BYX:

**BACKGROUND**

1. JPMS, a wholly-owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co., is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in New York, New York. The Firm provides services to corporate and broker-dealer clients and institutional investors, provides wealth management and brokerage services to individuals, and acts as an agency broker-dealer, providing market access and execution services to market participants ("Market Access Clients") for a wide variety of products.
2. The Firm has been registered with BYX since September 15, 2010, and with FINRA since December 17, 1936. Its registrations remain in effect. The Firm does not have a relevant disciplinary history.

### Summary

3. In Matter No. 20150478122, the Market Manipulation Investigations Section of FINRA's Department of Market Regulation ("Market Regulation") conducted reviews of potentially violative or manipulative trading by JPMS customers that occurred on the Exchange on three dates in July 2015, and the Firm's compliance with Rule 15c3-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA") (the "Market Access Rule").<sup>1</sup>
4. The above matter, and Matter No. 20120348296, were part of investigations conducted by Market Regulation on behalf of the Exchange and other self-regulatory organizations, including The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Bats BZX Exchange, Inc., Bats EDGX Exchange, Inc., NYSE Arca Equities, Inc., NYSE Arca Options, Inc., The NASDAQ Options Market LLC, and NASDAQ PHLX LLC (collectively, the "SROs"), to review the Firm's compliance with the Market Access Rule and the supervisory rules of the relevant SROs, including BYX Rules 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 3.1, during the period of May 2012 through at least April 2016 (the "Review Period").
5. As a result of Market Regulation's investigations, it was determined that, during the Review Period, JPMS failed to establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures, including written supervisory procedures and an adequate system of follow-up and review, reasonably designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of its market access business.
6. Specifically, during the Review Period, the Firm failed to establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements, including supervising customer trading to detect and prevent potentially violative and manipulative activity, in violation of SEA Rules 15c3-5(b) and (c)(2), and BYX Rules 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 3.1.

### Violative Conduct

#### Applicable Rules

7. During the Review Period, SEA Rule 15c3-5(b) required broker-dealers that provide market access to establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of their market access business.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The SEC adopted Rule 15c3-5 effective July 14, 2011. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5, *Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access*, 75 Fed. Reg. 69792, 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (Final Rule Release).

<sup>2</sup> Rule 15c3-5 requires that broker-dealers providing market access must "appropriately control the risks associated with market access so as not to jeopardize their own financial condition, that of other market participants, the integrity of trading on the securities markets, and the stability of the financial system." 75 Fed. Reg. 69792, 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5.

8. During the Review Period, SEA Rule 15c3-5(c)(2) required market access broker-dealers to have regulatory risk management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements.
9. Rule 15c3-5 requires, among other things, that a broker-dealer with market access document its system of risk management controls and supervisory procedures that are designed to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of market access. The broker-dealer must preserve a copy of its supervisory procedures and "a written description of its risk management controls" as part of its books and records for the time period required by SEC Rule 17a-4(e)(7).<sup>3</sup> The required written description is intended, among other things, to assist SEC and SRO staff to assess the broker-dealer's compliance with the rule. Exchange Act Release No. 34-63241, 75 Fed. Reg. 69792, 69812 (Nov. 15, 2010).
10. During the Review Period, BYX Rules 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 required, among other things, that each member firm establish, maintain and enforce written procedures to enable it to properly supervise the activities of associated persons to ensure compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations and BYX Rules.
11. During the Review Period, BYX Rule 3.1 provided that member firms, in the conduct of their business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.

#### **Overview of JPMS's Market Access Systems**

12. During the Review Period, JPMS was a significant market access provider, acting as the gateway to U.S. securities markets and executing tens of millions of trades per day for its Market Access Clients.
13. During the Review Period, JPMS had a number of different Divisions through which orders were sent to various markets, and each Division had a number of different Desks (*i.e.*, areas of operation). These Divisions included the Firm's Global Wealth Management Division, and the Institutional Equities Division.
14. During the Review Period, JPMS used a variety of systems (*e.g.*, order management systems, algorithms, etc.) through which its Market Access Clients and traders entered orders for routing to and execution on various U.S. securities markets, including the SROs. Several of those systems contained controls and filters to which the orders submitted were subjected. In addition, JPMS assigned and applied various controls to individual Market Access Clients and traders to which orders submitted by those clients and traders were subjected before submission to the various markets. Moreover, the Firm monitored its Market Access Clients and traders' orders on a post-trade basis for, among other things, potentially manipulative activity.

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<sup>3</sup> See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5(b), which by virtue of a cross-reference to Rule 17a-4(e)(7), requires a broker-dealer to maintain and preserve such description "until three years after the termination of the use of" the document. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(e)(7).

### Inadequate Supervision of Customer Trading

15. During 2015, JPMS used a series of post-trade surveillance reports run by a commercial non-proprietary Third-Party Surveillance System ("Third-Party Surveillance System") to monitor and review customer trading activity to detect, escalate and ultimately prevent potentially violative or manipulative trading activity, including layering<sup>4</sup> and spoofing.<sup>5</sup>
16. Pursuant to the parameters in the Third-Party Surveillance System utilized by the Firm, several thresholds must be met in order to generate layering and spoofing alerts on the Firm's exception reports. Certain of these thresholds, however, were set at levels that were unreasonable to detect activity that may be indicative of layering and spoofing activity.
17. For example, one threshold requires that potential non-bona fide orders must be priced within a certain number of ticks of the national best bid or offer ("NBBO") which, as currently employed by the Firm, would fail to identify instances of potential layering or spoofing when the non-bona fide orders were displayed and priced at the NBBO or established a new best bid or offer.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, another threshold requires that the volume on the opposite side of the market must exceed a certain set percentage of the ADTV of the relevant security for the preceding 30 day period in order for an alert to be generated. However, since this percentage is the same for all securities regardless of the ADTV of a security, this exception report would be less likely to identify potential layering or spoofing in a security with a significant ADTV.
18. As a result of the above, JPMS failed to adequately supervise certain of its customers' trading, and failed to detect potentially violative layering activity that occurred on several days on the Exchange in July 2015.
19. The acts, practices, and conduct described above in paragraphs 15 through 18 constitute violations of SEA Rules 15c3-5(b) and (c)(2), and BYX Rules 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 3.1.

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<sup>4</sup> Layering is a form of market manipulation that typically includes placement of multiple limit orders on one side of the market at various price levels that are intended to create the appearance of a change in the levels of supply and demand. In some instances, layering involves placing multiple limit orders at the same or varying prices across multiple exchanges or other trading venues. An order is then executed on the opposite side of the market and most, if not all, of the multiple limit orders are immediately cancelled. The purpose of the multiple limit orders that are subsequently cancelled is to induce, or trick, other market participants to enter orders due to the appearance of interest created by the orders such that the trader is able to receive a more favorable execution on the opposite side of the market.

<sup>5</sup> Spoofing is also a manipulative trading tactic designed to induce other market participants into executing trades. Spoofing is a form of market manipulation that generally involves, but is not limited to, the market manipulator placing an order or orders with the intention of cancelling the order or orders once they have triggered some type of market movement and/or response from other market participants, from which the market manipulator might benefit by trading on the opposite side of the market.

<sup>6</sup> In April 2017, JPMS began using an additional spoofing exception report that considers orders displayed and priced at the NBBO.

B. The Firm also consents to the imposition of the following sanctions:

1. A censure;
2. A fine in the amount of \$800,000, of which \$15,000 is payable to BYX;<sup>7</sup> and
3. An undertaking requiring the Firm to address the Market Access Rule deficiencies described in this AWC and to ensure that it has implemented controls and procedures that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the rules and regulations cited herein.

Within 90 days of the date of this AWC, JPMS shall submit to the COMPLIANCE ASSISTANT, LEGAL SECTION, MARKET REGULATION DEPARTMENT, 9509 KEY WEST AVENUE, ROCKVILLE, MD 20850, a written report, certified by a senior management Firm executive, to [MarketRegulationComp@finra.org](mailto:MarketRegulationComp@finra.org) that provides the following information:

- i. A reference to this matter;
- ii. A representation that the Firm has addressed each of the deficiencies described above, including the specific measures or enhancements taken to address those deficiencies; and
- iii. The date(s) this was completed.

The Department of Market Regulation may, upon a showing of good cause and in its sole discretion, extend the time for compliance with these provisions.

4. Acceptance of this AWC is conditioned upon acceptance of similar settlement agreements in related matters between JPMS and each of the following self-regulatory organizations: Bats BZX Exchange, Inc., Bats EDGX Exchange, Inc., The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange, LLC., NYSE Arca Equities, Inc., NYSE Arca Options, Inc., The NASDAQ Options Market LLC, and NASDAQ PHLX LLC.

The Firm agrees to pay the monetary sanction(s) upon notice that this AWC has been accepted and that such payment(s) are due and payable. It has submitted an Election of Payment form showing the method by which it proposes to pay the fine imposed.

The Firm specifically and voluntarily waives any right to claim that it is unable to pay, now or at any time hereafter, the monetary sanction(s) imposed in this matter.

The sanctions imposed herein shall be effective on a date set by BYX.

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<sup>7</sup> The balance of the sanction will be paid to the self-regulatory organizations listed in Paragraph B.4.

## II.

### WAIVER OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

The Firm specifically and voluntarily waives the following rights granted under BYX Rules:

- A. To have a Statement of Charges issued specifying the allegations against it;
- B. To be notified of the Statement of Charges and have the opportunity to answer the allegations in writing;
- C. To defend against the allegations in a disciplinary hearing before a Hearing Panel, to have a written record of the hearing made and to have a written decision issued; and
- D. To appeal any such decision to the Appeals Committee of the BYX's Board of Directors and then to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and a U.S. Court of Appeals.

Further, the Firm specifically and voluntarily waives any right to claim bias or prejudgment of the Chief Regulatory Officer ("CRO"), in connection with his or her participation in discussions regarding the terms and conditions of this AWC, or other consideration of this AWC, including acceptance or rejection of this AWC.

The Firm further specifically and voluntarily waives any right to claim that a person violated the ex parte prohibitions of BYX Rule 8.16, in connection with such person's or body's participation in discussions regarding the terms and conditions of this AWC, or other consideration of this AWC, including its acceptance or rejection.

## III.

### OTHER MATTERS

The Firm understands that:

- A. Submission of this AWC is voluntary and will not resolve this matter unless and until it has been reviewed and accepted by the CRO, pursuant to BYX Rule 8.3;
- B. If this AWC is not accepted, its submission will not be used as evidence to prove any of the allegations against the Firm; and
- C. If accepted:
  - 1. This AWC will become part of the Firm's permanent disciplinary record and may be considered in any future actions brought by BYX or any other regulator against the Firm;
  - 2. This AWC will be published on a website maintained by BYX in accordance with BYX Rule 8.18. In addition, this AWC will be made available through FINRA's public disclosure program in response to public inquiries about the Firm's disciplinary record; and

3. The Firm may not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement, including in regulatory filings or otherwise, denying, directly or indirectly, any finding in this AWC or create the impression that the AWC is without factual basis. The Firm may not take any position in any proceeding brought by or on behalf of BYX, or to which BYX is a party, that is inconsistent with any part of this AWC. Nothing in this provision affects the Firm's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which BYX is not a party.

D. The Firm may attach a Corrective Action Statement to this AWC that is a statement of demonstrable corrective steps taken to prevent future misconduct. The Firm understands that it may not deny the charges or make any statement that is inconsistent with the AWC in this Statement. This Statement does not constitute factual or legal findings by BYX, nor does it reflect the views of BYX or its staff.

The undersigned, on behalf of the Firm, certifies that a person duly authorized to act on its behalf has read and understands all of the provisions of this AWC and has been given a full opportunity to ask questions about it; that it has agreed to the AWC's provisions voluntarily; and that no offer, threat, inducement, or promise of any kind, other than the terms set forth herein and the prospect of avoiding the issuance of a Complaint, has been made to induce the Firm to submit it.

6/9/17  
Date

J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, Respondent

By: William Frestel  
Name: William Frestel  
Title: Morgan Director

Reviewed by:  
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Counsel for Respondent

6/21/2017  
Date

Greg Hoogasian  
Greg Hoogasian  
Senior Vice President & Chief Regulatory Officer  
Bats BYX Exchange, Inc.

**ELECTION OF PAYMENT FORM**

The Firm intends to pay the fine proposed in the attached Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent by the following method (check one):

- A Firm check or bank check for the full amount; or
- Wire transfer.

Respectfully submitted,

J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, Respondent

June 12, 2017

Date

By: Judith Romaine

Name: JUDITH ROMAINÉ

Title: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL